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Quite often now, when I click on a link to a news article, I am greeted by a message explaining that I will not be able to see it.

For Internet Privacy advocates like me, the recent vote by Congress to authorize ISP to sell customer information is disheartening.

Today, the 17th of May 2016, the IETF Editor published RFC 7844, an Anonymity Profile for DHCPv4 and DHCPv6 clients, and RFC 7858, transmission of DNS requests over TLS.

As you may know, I care a lot about Internet privacy.

Two years have passed since the Snowden revelations, and almost two years since the IETF meeting in Vancouver.

Last month, I spent a lot of time looking at Wi-Fi protocols, and in particular at the privacy implications of Wi-Fi on mobile devices.

Ars Technica and NPR collaborated on an interesting story.

Many years ago, I worked on email standards, developing for example a gateway between SMTP/TCP-IP and X.400.

Right when the whole industry appears to respond to the NSA spying by reinforcing their encryption defense, we learn about a bug in Apple's TLS implementation.

Some time ago, in 2005, Tuomas Aura of Microsoft Research proposed a way to embed a "cryptographic proof" in the IPv6 addresses.

Our representatives just voted down the amendment do defund the NSA domestic monitoring program.

Bruce Schneier's post on Internet privacy hits the nail on the head.

I just read the paper on Teredo published in the Computer Communication Review: Investigating the IPv6 Teredo Tunnelling Capability and Performance of Internet Clients by Sebastian Zander, Lachlan L.

The IETF is in a pickle again.

Was it just yesterday that people could just sit on a bench in a foreign city, scan the airwave, and just connect to an open Wi-Fi network?

It seems that the Internet engineers like to periodically revisit old discussions.

Folks seem to discover that Google knows a whole lot about us.

It has been about 10 months since the "Comodo Hacker" managed to get false PKI certificates from the Italian reseller of the Comodo certification authority.

There was a thread on Slashdot today about an "Anonymous hacker" who got caught by the FBI after launching a Denial of Service attack.

Steve Jobs justified the "walled garden" approach of the IPhone's App Store by saying that it provided freedom, freedom from spam, freedom from viruses, freedom from porn.

A colleague pointed me to Telex.CC, a project from the University of Michigan that proposes "a new approach to circumventing Internet censorship that is intended to help citizens of repressive governments freely access online services and information."

Many peer-to-peer systems rely on Distributed Hash Tables.

It appears that Microsoft does not in fact support SOPA, the draconian copyright protection proposal that the congress is working on.

Social networks are exclusive.

Jon Crowcroft pointed me to Safebook, a peer to peer social network developed by a team of researchers at Eurecom.

Recently, I found myself writing to an IPv6 IETF mailing list that a critical part of the IPv6 design “looked like a good idea at the time” but in fact was not.

Extending DNS operation for peer-to-peer name resolution may be much simpler than many expect.

The concept of “self-keying” domain names emerged as a parallel thread in the discussion of P2P DNS name.

For privacy advocates, the move of computing to the cloud looks scary.

Here we go again.

At some level, the P2P DNS is a kneejerk reaction against arbitrary revocation of names by DNS registries.

One of the designs proposed for a P2P name service is to “use a Distributed Hash Table” to distribute the resolution of the names in a P2P zone.

There is an obvious security issue with P2P names: spoofing.

I am looking at the web page of the P2P “Open NIC” project: http://wiki.opennicproject.org/dotP2PTLD.

Why am I not surprised?