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Abstract: In this talk, I examine interconnections between norms governing assertion, denial, questions and answers, and the common ground of a discourse.

Abstract: In this talk, I examine some of the interconnections between norms governing assertion, denial, questions and answers, and the common ground of a discourse.

Abstract: In this talk, I show how a category of classical proofs can give rise to three different hyperintensional notions of sameness of content.

Abstract: In this talk I present a new frame semantics for positive substructural and relevant propositional logics.

PHIL30043: The Power and Limits of Logic is a University of Melbourne undergraduate subject.

UNIB10002: Logic, Language and Information is a University of Melbourne undergraduate breadth subject, introducing logic and its applications to students from a wide range of disciplines in the Arts, Sciences and Engineering.

In this paper, I motivate a cut free sequent calculus for classical logic with first order quantification, allowing for singular terms free of existential import.

Abstract: In this talk, I motivate and define a cut free sequent calculus for first order modal predicate logics, allowing for singular terms free of existential import.

This summer break, I set aside some time to turn off my devices, unplug from the internet, and read some honest-to-goodness books.

Abstract: In this talk, I provide two different models for a theory of grounds meeting the following desiderata:\(\def\yright{\succ}\) Grammar: There are objects, which we call grounds, which can be grounds for propositions or grounds against propositions.

Abstract: Our thoughts and our conversations are filled with generalisations.

Last Wednesday, I went down to the studios at ABC Southbank, to be interviewed by Libbi Gorr for ABC Radio Melbourne’s Sunday program.

If you’ve been following my travels, you’ll get some sense that this has been a busy year.

Abstract: In this talk, I aim to give an account of norms governing our uses of generic judgements (like “kangaroos have long tails”, “birds lay eggs”, or “logic talks are boring”), norms governing inference, and the relationship between generics and infe…

Abstract: In this talk, I aim to give an account of norms governing our uses of generic judgements (like “kangaroos have long tails”, “birds lay eggs”, or “logic talks are boring”), norms governing inference, and the relationship between generics and infe…

Abstract: In this talk, I will present an account of defining rules, with the aim of explaining these rules they play a central role in analytic proofs.

Abstract: I introduce the key themes from my book-in-progress, Proof Theory, Rules and Meaning.

PHIL30043: The Power and Limits of Logic is a University of Melbourne undergraduate subject.

PHIL20030: Meaning, Possibility and Paradox is a University of Melbourne undergraduate subject.

Abstract: In this short talk, I present a new account of the nature of proof, with the aim of explaining how proof could actually play the role in reasoning that it does, and answering some long-standing puzzles about the nature of proof.

Abstract: In this talk, I show how a category of formulas and classical proofs can give rise to three different hyperintensional notions of sameness of content.

Abstract: In this talk, I aim to give an account of norms governing our uses of generic judgements (like “kangaroos have long tails”, “birds lay eggs”, or “logic talks are boring”), norms governing inference, and the relationship between generics and infe…

Abstract: In this talk, I aim to give an account of norms governing our uses of generic judgements (like “kangaroos have long tails”, “birds lay eggs”, or “logic talks are boring”), norms governing inference, and the relationship between generics and infe…

Abstract: In this talk, I aim to give an account of norms governing our uses of generic judgements (like “kangaroos have long tails”, “birds lay eggs”, or “logic talks are boring”), norms governing inference, and the relationship between generics and infe…

Abstract: In this talk, I show how a category of formulas and classical proofs can give rise to three different hyperintensional notions of sameness of content.

Abstract: In this talk, I show how a category of classical proofs can give rise to three different hyperintensional notions of sameness of content.

Abstract: In this short talk, I present a new account of the nature of proof, with the aim of explaining how proof could actually play the role in reasoning that it does, and answering some long-standing puzzles about the nature of proof.

Abstract: In this talk, I aim to give an account of norms governing our uses of generic judgements (like “kangaroos have long tails”, “birds lay eggs”, or “logic talks are boring”), norms governing inference, and the relationship between generics and infe…

Abstract: In this talk, I aim to give an account of norms governing our uses of generic judgements (like “kangaroos have long tails”, “birds lay eggs”, or “logic talks are boring”), norms governing inference, and the relationship between generics and infe…

Stephen Read’s work on Bradwardine’s theory of truth is some of the most exciting work on truth and insolubilia in recent years.

Abstract: In this talk, I show how a category of propositions and classical proofs can give rise to three different hyperintensional notions of sameness of content.

I love the way I’ve met so many different people through working in logic, that I’ve made good friends, good colleagues, good teachers and mentors.

Abstract: This talk is a comparison of how different approaches to hyperintensionality, aboutness and subject matter treat (classically) logically equivalent statements.

Abstract: In this talk, I explain the difference between Australian Plan semantics for negation – which treat negation as a kind of negative modality – and semantics based on the American Plan, which conceive of negation in terms of independent truth and…

Working in philosophical logic, I love the opportunity to learn from so many people through history, and not only to learn, but to pass on a tradition, and to have the opportunity to extend the tradition, and to refine it a little, in passing it on.

In the previous entry I explored the connection between proofs and necessity.

The next two thoughts are motivated by the two complementary aspects of contemporary research in logic, proof theory and model theory.

I’m not totally happy with the word for the next item on the list of twelve things I love about philosophical logic.

Some of my phrasing in the last two posts about what I love about philosophical logic have emphasised capacities, or abilities.

There are different delights to be found in working with concepts.

Here is a more personal reflection on what I love in working in philosophical logic.

The multiple realisations of a concept in logic often come from different disciplines.

Closely connected to the notion of abstraction, I love the way that logical concepts are multiply realisable.

As I mentioned in the previous entry, philosophical logic uses the tools and techniques from formal logic, and formal logic is nothing if it is not abstract.

One thing I noticed when making my way from mathematics (my undergraduate degree was a B.Sc. in Mathematics at the University of Queensland) to philosophy was the different approach when doing research in the two disciplines.

Over this last weekend, I spent some time tidying out one of the electronic “junk drawers” of my writing life, a folder full of thousands upon thousands of little scraps of text, ranging from minutes of meetings, recipes I’ve saved, little ideas I came ac…

PHIL40013: Uncertainty, Vagueness and Paradox is a University of Melbourne honours seminar subject for fourth-year students.

PHIL20030: Meaning, Possibility and Paradox is a University of Melbourne undergraduate subject.

Over the last couple of days on Twitter, I was involved in a thread, kicked off by Dan Piponi, discussing closed set logic—the natural dual of intuitionistic logic in which the law of the excluded middle holds but the law of non-contradiction fails, and w…

In a few recent papers and talks, I’ve been using flow graphs to display the flow of information in proofs.